The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives - A Field Experiment on the Adoption of Personal Electronic Health Records by Gabel, Marie et al.
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
ICIS 2019 Proceedings IS in Healthcare 
The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives - A Field Experiment on the 
Adoption of Personal Electronic Health Records 
Marie Gabel 
WWU University Muenster, marie.gabel@wiwi.uni-muenster.de 
J. Nils Foege 
WWU Münster, nils.foege@wiwi.uni-muenster.de 
Stephan Nüesch 
University of Muenster, nueesch@wwu.de 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2019 
Gabel, Marie; Foege, J. Nils; and Nüesch, Stephan, "The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives - A Field 
Experiment on the Adoption of Personal Electronic Health Records" (2019). ICIS 2019 Proceedings. 19. 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2019/is_health/is_health/19 
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICIS 2019 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
 The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 1 
The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives - A Field 
Experiment on the Adoption of Personal 
Electronic Health Records  






D-48143 Muenster  
marie.gabel@wiwi.uni-muenster.de 
 
J. Nils Foege 
Assistant Professor  
Georgskommende 26 
D-48143 Muenster  
nils.foege@wiwi.uni-muenster.de 
Stephan Nüesch 
Professor & Head of Group 
Georgskommende 26 





Medication errors are the third-leading cause of death in the US; however, a large 
number of these cases could be prevented through better medication management. The 
aging population and the associated high number of individuals taking multiple 
medications regularly makes medication management even more important. Personal 
electronic health records (PHRs) can improve medication management significantly and 
thus increase patient safety. Despite unequivocal benefits for individuals, healthcare 
professionals, governments, insurers, and employers, the adoption rate of PHRs remains 
low. Therefore, we seek to identify measures that motivate individuals to adopt PHRs. 
Drawing on justice theory, we show that incentives in terms of personalization, as well 
as the signal of fair information practices, increase the adoption rate of PHRs. These 
effects are mediated by perceived benefits and privacy concerns, respectively. Based on 
counterintuitive findings on the effects of monetary compensation we start a discussion 
on the complexity and context-dependency of different incentives. 
Keywords: Personal electronic health records (PHRs), financial incentives, personalization, fair 
information practices, justice theory 
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Introduction 
Worldwide, medical errors are one of the most common and fatal problems of the health sector. They are 
the third-leading cause of death after heart diseases and cancer, leading to 250,000 deaths in the U.S. every 
year (Johns Hopkins 2016). Errors include failures in monitoring patients on powerful drugs, poor 
communication between patients and physicians, or giving patients the wrong medication. Many of these 
deaths could have been avoided by better medication management. As many elderly people have to take 
several medications regularly, medication management becomes especially important given the aging 
population. Personal electronic health records (PHRs), i.e. “electronic health record[s] on an individual that 
can be […] managed, shared, and controlled by the individual” (Ozdemir et al. 2011, p. 491), have the 
potential to improve medication management, increase patient safety and support the overall healthcare 
efficiency significantly (Miller and Tucker 2009; Reti et al. 2009; Vance et al. 2015). PHRs allow individuals 
to digitally organize and access their personal health information and provide healthcare professionals 
limited access to relevant information. PHRs can include information on medication adherence or 
symptoms, as well as information on treatments and diagnosis from doctors, insurance companies or other 
healthcare professionals. Thereby, PHRs constitute a lifelong, integrated and encompassing overview of the 
personal health (Markle Foundation 2003). As such, researchers see PHRs as an important building block 
for the future of health care (Fichman et al. 2011; Raisinghani and Young 2008; Reti et al. 2009). 
It comes as a surprise that, despite these huge benefits, the adoption rate of PHRs among individuals 
remains low (Assadi and Hassanein 2017; Liu et al. 2011; Raisinghani and Young 2008). Previous studies 
argue that privacy concerns are the main reason for the lack of enthusiasm for PHRs (Agarwal et al. 2013; 
Goldschmidt 2005; Kaelber et al. 2008; Vance et al. 2015). Privacy concerns relate to the perceived risk of 
data misuse associated with the disclosure of personal data. Following the notions of the privacy calculus, 
individuals base their decision to use electronic products and services on a risk-benefit assessment (Culnan 
and Armstrong 1999; Laufer and Wolfe 1977). In health care, data misuse can have serious consequences 
due to the sensitive nature of personal health information (Yao et al. 2015). Therefore, the decision to adopt 
digital health solutions is substantially affected by a complex dilemma between risks and benefits of data 
sharing (Li et al. 2016). 
Integrating privacy calculus and justice theory (Culnan and Bies 2003), we argue that perceived fairness 
can help to overcome the privacy concerns associated with the disclosure of personal health information. 
In other words, individuals will disclose personal health information and adopt PHR platforms if they 
believe that they will be treated fairly within the digital healthcare system. Colquitt et al. (2001, p. 425) 
suggest that the perception of fairness has two dimensions: Distributive justice, “the fairness of outcome 
distributions or allocations,” and procedural justice, “the fairness of the procedures used to determine 
outcome distributions or allocations.” According to the concept of distributive justice, individuals engage 
in an exchange process if the ratio of input and output is perceived as fair (Colquitt et al. 2001). The offer 
of certain incentives in exchange for the disclosure of personal health information could, therefore, increase 
perceived fairness and thus motivate individuals to adopt PHRs. Align with the theoretical notions of justice 
theory (Culnan and Bies 2003), we implemented distributive justice in form of monetary compensation and 
personalized content, i.e. a personal health report that provides individuals with additional information 
about their health. 
According to the concept of procedural justice, transparent, and controllable processes in the exchange 
relationship increase individuals’ perceptions of fairness. As fair information practices implemented by 
PHR providers signal individuals that their personal health information is being treated in a transparent, 
respectful, and controllable manner, perceived fairness increases, which in turn is expected to increase the 
adoption rate of PHRs (Colquitt et al. 2001). Taking all aspects into consideration, we ask: Can distributive 
justice in form of financial incentives and personalization incentives, and procedural justice in form of the 
signal of fair information practices, promote the adoption of PHRs? 
To answer this question, we conducted a randomized controlled field experiment with a sample of 216 
participants. In cooperation with eHealth ventures, a provider of the PHR application POLAVIS VIVA, we 
examined the effects of financial incentives, personalization incentives, and fair information practices on 
individuals’ privacy concerns, perceived benefits, data provision behavior, and opt-in behavior on POLAVIS 
VIVA. Our results demonstrate that personalization incentives increase the PHR adoption rate significantly 
and that this effect is mediated by the benefits perceived by the individual. Moreover, we show that fair 
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information practices increase the PHR adoption rate significantly. Our analyses further suggest that 
privacy concerns mediate this relationship. However, it comes as a surprise that financial incentives, in 
contrast to personalization incentives and fair information practices, do not increase the adoption rate. We 
suggest that even though the three organizational measures address fairness perceptions, they are perceived 
and attributed differently by individuals in the healthcare context. While personalization incentives and fair 
information practices directly or indirectly relate to the PHR platform, monetary compensation constitutes 
a value that is independent of the ultimate purpose of PHRs, i.e. improving individuals’ healthcare 
management. Thus, we emphasize that the components of justice are more complex and context dependent 
than previously assumed. 
This article contributes to the literature on health information technology adoption in three ways. First, we 
contribute to the theoretical understanding of PHR adoption decisions by applying an overarching justice 
theory framework. Previous studies are mainly based on privacy calculus and technology acceptance models 
(Li et al. 2016); however, justice theory provides promising yet unanalyzed solutions to advance the 
adoption of PHRs. Second, we examine the role of incentives for PHR adoption (Anderson and Agarwal 
2011). As PHRs drive the overall digitization of health care (Romanow et al. 2012), the identification and 
analysis of measures that support PHR adoption decisions are crucial. No previous study has analyzed the 
impact of different incentives on health information technology adoption among individuals. Third, we use 
a randomized controlled field experiment to test our hypotheses. This allows us to measure actual behavior 
instead of attitude or behavioral intention. Evidence on actual PHR adoption is still scarce, but particularly 
important given the often discussed attitude-behavior gap (Acquisti et al. 2015). 
Conceptual Background 
Personal health data is attributed by individuals as one of the most sensitive information (Angst and 
Agarwal 2009; Bansal et al. 2010). Therefore, data privacy concerns constitute a major barrier to the 
disclosure of personal health information, i.e. information that can be assigned to an individual (Culnan 
and Bies 2003). Subsequently, the dissemination of data-driven health technologies is inhibited. 
Information privacy is defined as the ability of individuals to control the conditions under which their 
personal information is collected and used (Culnan and Bies 2003). Information privacy research argues 
that individuals base their decision to use electronic products and services on a risk-benefit assessment 
known as the privacy calculus (Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Laufer and Wolfe 1977). The privacy calculus 
proposes that individuals will disclose personal information online if they perceive that the benefits of 
disclosure exceed the risks (Culnan and Armstrong 1999; Dinev and Hart 2006; Smith et al. 2011). Thus, 
individuals will accept the risks in exchange for sufficient benefits provided by the counterpart (Dinev et al. 
2013). The privacy calculus has been frequently applied in information privacy research. Even though 
health data are considered to be the most sensitive type of data (e.g. Bansal et al. 2010), we draw our 
theorizing also from leading information systems studies analyzing financial or location-based data. In this 
regard, the studies of Angst and Agarwal (2011), Dinev and Hart (2006), Kehr et al. (2015), Xu et al. (2009), 
or Xu et al. (2011) are particularly noteworthy as they provide valuable insights into online privacy behavior. 
All of the named studies apply the privacy calculus as their main theoretical framework. 
To further examine the privacy calculus and enhance the understanding of individuals’ decision making 
regarding the disclosure of personal information, Culnan and Bies (2003) combine the privacy calculus 
with a justice theory perspective. They propose that individuals conduct the risk-benefit assessment 
predicted by the privacy calculus, but that the resulting behavioral decisions depend on the perceived 
fairness within the exchange relationship. In other words, “the outcomes of risk-benefit analysis of personal 
information disclosure, at the individual level, could be differentiated according to the extent to which 
justice provisions are manifested in privacy interventions” (Xu et al. 2009, p. 139). 
According to justice theory, perceived fairness is represented by different dimensions of justice. Among 
scholars, there is controversy about the number of dimensions; however, following a meta-analysis of 183 
justice theory studies of Colquitt et al. (2001), the two subordinate components influencing individuals’ 
decisions about disclosing information are distributive justice and procedural justice. 
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the output individuals receive in exchange for the 
disclosure of their personal information. According to distributive justice, individuals base their behavioral 
decisions on an assessment of provided input and received output (Colquitt et al. 2001). If they perceive a 
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fair input-output ratio, individuals will disclose their information. Following Culnan and Bies (2003), we 
suggest that value in terms of financial compensation and personalization can increase individuals’ 
perceptions that distributive justice is present. Both financial and personalization incentives constitute 
additional benefits in exchange for personal health information and should, in turn, increase the likelihood 
of PHR adoption. However, regarding the mechanisms of incentives the PHR context differs from e-
commerce or other contexts that involve a monetary exchange. Whereas financial incentives in terms of 
monetary compensation do not directly support the ultimate objective of PHRs, personalization incentives 
directly increase the utility of PHRs through advanced content tailored to the individuals. 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of information collection and use (Xu et al. 2009). If 
individuals perceive that they have control over the process of collection and use of their personal health 
information, the exchange relationship will be perceived as fair and privacy concerns will be mitigated. As 
a result, individuals will be more likely to disclose their personal information. Following Culnan and Bies 
(2003), procedural justice can be implemented through fair information practices. Fair information 
practices signal individuals that their information privacy is being treated in a respectful manner, and thus 
that the organization can be trusted (Culnan and Bies 2003; Xu et al. 2009). As a result, privacy concerns 
are reduced. According to Schwaig et al. (2006), fair information practices include five core principles: 
Notice of data collection and use, consent and choice about data collection and data sharing with third 
parties, access to and modification of information, security to prevent unauthorized access, and 
enforcement to ensure the compliance of the firm with these data privacy principles. As fair information 
practices signal to individuals that their personal information is treated in a transparent and controllable 
manner, we argue that procedural justice in terms of fair information practices increases the perceived 
fairness and in turn the likelihood of PHR adoption. 
Hypotheses 
Distributive Justice 
The fear of data misuse and unauthorized dissemination of data constitute a key barrier for individuals in 
sharing their personal information (Xu et al. 2012). Misuse of personal health data can have serious 
consequences, leading to privacy concerns that are preventing individuals from the adoption of new 
technologies. However, following Culnan and Bies (2003), organizations can mitigate the privacy concerns 
if they improve individuals’ distributive justice perceptions. The concept of distributive justice reflects the 
fair allocation of output that individuals receive in return for the input provided. Culnan and Bies (2003) 
theorize that individuals assess the output they expect to receive in exchange for providing their personal 
information to organizations. To motivate individuals to disclose personal information, the value of the 
output should compensate for the value of the personal information. Therefore, we expect that individuals 
will adopt PHRs if they perceive a fair output in exchange for the input of personal health information. 
Financial Incentives 
The input-output assessment associated with the usage of PHR platforms is complex and multifaceted as 
risks and benefits can hardly be quantified. However, the subjective benefits can be increased through the 
offer of rewards in exchange for the disclosure of personal data (Hui et al. 2007; Premazzi et al. 2010). In 
this regard even small rewards can outweigh the privacy concerns and motivate individuals to disclose 
personal information (Acquisti and Grossklags 2005). Laufer and Wolfe (1977) argue that individuals will 
disclose personal information in exchange for financial benefits. Financial benefits represent an additional 
value that improves the subjective input-output assessment and improves perceptions of distributive justice 
(Xu et al. 2009). 
However, two underlying mechanisms of financial incentives have to be taken into account that partly 
contradict the notions of justice theory. First, Gneezy et al. (2011) identified counter effects of financial 
incentives. Apart from the positive effect, financial incentives can also trigger a negative effect on the 
incentivized behavior by increasing the awareness that the counterpart collects and uses personal 
information (Gneezy et al. 2011). This effect has been found to be particularly salient in contexts of high 
risks and uncertainties (Hoffman et al. 1999), thus the context of sensitive health information can be critical 
(Bansal et al. 2010). Second, whereas the value of financial incentives is directly context related in e-
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commerce settings or other contexts that involve a monetary exchange, monetary compensation is not 
related to PHRs and thus only provides a context unrelated value in our study. 
Yet, prior research shows predominantly positive effects of financial incentives on data disclosure decisions 
and attitudes. For example, findings of Hui et al. (2007) show in the context of computing products that 
monetary compensation in form of a check has a positive influence on data disclosure decisions. Cichy et 
al. (2014) support this finding for the context of personal driving data. Premazzi et al. (2010) demonstrate 
in an e-commerce setting that even though participants did not claim that they would be more prone to 
provide information in return for monetary incentives in form of an online retail coupon, they actually were. 
Furthermore, Xu et al. (2009) prove in the context of location-based services that financial incentives in 
form of a discount on the monthly phone bill can increase perceived benefits.  
Drawing on the empirical findings of prior literature and on the theoretical notions of justice theory, we 
propose that PHR platform providers can improve individuals’ fairness perceptions of the outcomes 
through the provision of financial incentives. Consequently, we argue: 
Hypothesis 1. Organizations can increase the rate of PHR adoption if they provide financial incentives as a 
means to improve the individuals’ perception of distributive justice. 
Personalization Incentives 
In general, personalization refers to content that is tailored to individuals based on knowledge about those 
individuals (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005). There is a clear trend for firms using consumer information 
for personalization purposes (Awad and Krishnan 2006). In the healthcare domain, personalization offers 
unparalleled opportunities for value creation. The improvements in access to health data and in 
communication with healthcare providers through PHRs enable health care to be tailored to individual 
needs (Fichman et al. 2011). Furthermore, personalization in health care increases the efficiency of 
diagnosis processes and reduces medication errors (Reti et al. 2009; Vance et al. 2015). 
The personalization-privacy paradox (Awad and Krishnan 2006) plays a central role in the impact of 
personalization on behavioral decisions. Personalizing content and services to the individual is strongly 
related to data privacy because it involves large amounts of personal information (Xu et al. 2011). As 
personalization creates value only through the inclusion of personal information, personalization increases 
both perceived benefits and risks, leading to a dilemma in individuals’ decision-making process. Thus, 
individuals who are more concerned about data privacy are less likely to participate in personalization 
(Awad and Krishnan 2006). 
However, following the concept of distributive justice, value in terms of personalization has a positive effect 
on data disclosure decisions. According to Culnan and Bies (2003), along with the monetary exchange, 
distributive justice also consists of a non-monetary exchange, which they term “second exchange,” and in 
which individuals provide their personal information in return for personalized content or higher quality 
services. Following the concept of distributive justice, individuals provide their personal information if the 
input-output ratio is perceived as fair. As personalization constitutes an additional benefit, we argue that 
the provision of personalization incentives in exchange for personal health information can positively 
influence the individuals’ input-output assessment. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of personalization is inconsistent. Ward et al. (2005) could not find a 
significant effect of personalization incentives on the willingness to provide personal information in an 
online shopping context. By contrast, Awad and Krishnan (2006) and Chellappa and Sin (2005) show in an 
online service provider setting that personalized services increase perceived utility and in turn the 
likelihood of usage. Moreover, Xu et al. (2011) show that personalization incentives can significantly 
increase both perceived risks and benefits in the context of location-aware marketing. These results have 
all been found in different contexts. Therefore, we argue that the perceived benefits of personalization are 
strongly context dependent. Awad and Krishnan (2006) support this line of argumentation. They suggest 
that the effect of personalization on the behavior of individuals depends on the value that personalization 
creates. Whereas e-commerce settings involve an exchange of money, PHRs are about improving the 
healthcare situation of individuals. This inherent goal can be directly supported through the offer of 
personalized content and services. Thus, individuals should attribute a particularly high importance to 
personalization in the context of PHR adoption.  
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Drawing on justice theory, we argue that the offer of personalization incentives should increase individuals’ 
perceptions of positive outcomes of the privacy calculus through an improvement in those individuals’ 
distributive justice perceptions (Culnan and Bies 2003). Consequently, we propose the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2. Organizations can increase the rate of PHR adoption if they provide personalization 
incentives as a means to improve the individuals’ perception of distributive justice. 
Procedural Justice 
According to justice theory, perceptions of fairness in the context of information privacy arise not only 
through an exchange of benefits in return for information disclosure but also through fair processes in the 
collection and use of information (Culnan and Bies 2003; Xu et al. 2009). In other words, the way 
organizations treat the information will be reflected in the behavioral decisions of individuals (Culnan and 
Bies 2003). The concept of procedural justice states that if individuals perceive a fair treatment within the 
information exchange process, their willingness to disclose personal information increases (Culnan and 
Bies 2003). Fair information practices provide individuals with control and voice over the disclosure and 
subsequent use of their data (Culnan and Bies 2003). Because fair information practices ensure that 
organizations comply with privacy principles, they align the interests of individuals and organizations and 
serve as a social contract. Fair information practices provide a solution to increase perceived fairness and 
minimize privacy concerns. They signal to individuals that their information privacy is treated in a 
respectful manner and thus that the organization can be trusted (Culnan and Bies 2003; Xu et al. 2009). 
This form of trust is especially important in online contexts as the exchange relationship is characterized 
by uncertainty and social distance. Using PHR platforms, individuals rely on strangers to manage their 
highly sensitive personal health information. Therefore, trust-enabling mechanisms, as features of fair 
information practices, reduce privacy concerns and can subsequently increase the adoption rate of PHRs 
(Culnan and Bies 2003; Xu et al. 2009). 
Evidence on the impact of fair information practices is contradictory (Tsai et al. 2011). Results of Belanger 
et al. (2002) do not show a positive impact of privacy seals in an e-commerce context. Hui et al. (2007) 
support this finding using a computing products setting. By contrast, empirical results of Culnan and 
Armstrong (1999) provide evidence that emphasizing fair information practices can alleviate consumers’ 
data privacy concerns to disclose data for marketing purposes.  
Following the theoretical notions of procedural justice, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Organizations can increase the rate of PHR adoption if they signal fair information practices 
as a means to improve the individuals’ perception of procedural justice. 
Mediation Effects 
We combine privacy calculus and justice theory to explain the underlying mechanisms of the effects of 
financial incentives, personalization incentives, and fair information practices on PHR adoption. According 
to distributive justice individuals base their behavioral decisions on a risk benefit assessment. To induce 
individuals to adopt PHR platforms, the benefits should compensate for the value of the personal data. The 
provision of financial incentives and personalization incentives should increase the perceived benefits and 
in turn increase PHR adoption rates. Furthermore, following the concept of procedural justice, individuals 
value fairness of the collection process and use of personal data. As fair information practices signal to 
individuals that their data is treated in a fair and ethically correct manner, fair information practices should 
decrease privacy concerns and lead to an increase in PHR adoption rates. 
Building on these theoretical underpinnings, we pose the following mediation hypotheses: 
H4: The effects of financial incentives (a) and personalization incentives (b) on the PHR adoption rate are 
mediated by perceived benefits. The effects of fair information practices on the PHR adoption rate are 
mediated by privacy concerns (c). 
Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual model. 
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Figure 1. Research Model 
Method 
Experimental Design 
In cooperation with eHealth ventures, a provider of mobile health solutions in Germany, we conducted a 
randomized controlled field experiment. The experimental setting allows us to observe causal effects about 
actual PHR adoption rates. We designed the experiment as follows. First, participants received an e-mail 
invitation to register for POLAVIS VIVA (https://www.polavis-viva.de/en/), a PHR application hosted by 
eHealth ventures. The invitation e-mails contained a short description of the PHR functions to ensure that 
all participants had a common understanding. These functions include, among others, communication with 
health professionals, long-term data storage, medication monitoring, or appointment management. 
Furthermore, we included the treatment of each scenario and the registration link in the e-mails. All e-mails 
had the same subject line and pre-header (the text below subject line in the inbox). Hence, we introduced 
the treatments only after participants opened the e-mails. Analogous to the three independent variables, 
our experiment contained three treatments: financial incentives, personalization incentives, and fair 
information practices. As a control group, we also added a base scenario that simply invited the recipient to 
use POLAVIS VIVA without offering any incentives. In the first treatment, participants were told that they 
would receive a five euros Amazon voucher as a welcome gift via e-mail after registration. We chose the 
amount of five euros based on similar experimental settings of related literature (e.g. Hui et al. 2007). In 
the second treatment, eHealth ventures implemented personalization incentives in the form of a personal 
health report given to participants based on their data provided on POLAVIS VIVA. The report provided 
the user with personalized health-related information and statistics on their medical history. Individuals 
were not required to provide additional information and could download the report on the app in PDF 
format. The personal health report developed by eHealth ventures complied with the definition of 
personalization introduced above (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 2005). In the third treatment, participants 
were told that the data privacy practices of POLAVIS VIVA comply with the highest security standards in 
Germany and are certified by the IPS data privacy seal, a nationwide data protection standard for online 
services. We chose a data privacy seal to signal fair information practices in contrast to a privacy statement 
since only measures that go beyond legal standards will make a difference for the behavioral decisions of 
individuals (Awad and Krishnan 2006). As privacy statements are legally binding in most countries, only 
privacy seals or other data privacy certificates that go beyond legal standards constitute appropriate 
measures for organizations to stand out in regard to their information practices (Awad and Krishnan 2006). 
None of the three treatments required any additional effort that might influence the cost-benefit assessment 
of individuals. In the invitation e-mails, we highlighted the respective treatment by both text and pictures 
to draw the attention of participants to the treatment. In addition to the general introduction of POLAVIS 
VIVAs functions and the written description of the treatments, the first treatment included a picture of an 
amazon voucher, the second treatment a picture of the personal health report, and the third treatment 
showed the IPS data privacy seal. 
Corresponding to the four scenarios, eHealth ventures created one landing page for each of the four 
scenarios. This method is necessary for three reasons. First, it enables matching of the registrations to the 
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respective treatment. Second, it avoids unintentional overlaps between the scenarios. These overlaps could 
arise when participants of one scenario have access to the landing pages of other scenarios. Third, it 
guarantees that we included only those participants that received the experimental e-mail into the sample. 
In other words, we did not consider individuals that registered for POLAVIS VIVA through the original 
landing-page. One week after sending the e-mail invitations, we sent a follow-up questionnaire to those 
participants who had opened the invitation e-mail. Through e-mail addresses, we matched back registration 
behavior to the information participants provided in the follow-up questionnaire. Whether participants 
answered the follow-up questionnaire or not was independent of the treatments. 
Operationalization of Variables 
We included the three treatments of financial incentives (Financial), personalization incentives 
(Personalization), and fair information practices (FIP) in the final model as dummy variables. The 
dependent variable Registration describes through a dummy variable the opt-in behavior for POLAVIS 
VIVA. Moreover, we observed the number of health data provided on POLAVIS VIVA after opt-in. However, 
since we did not find any significant differences in the number of health data provided by individuals after 
they registered for POLAVIS VIVA, we use, like Angst and Agarwal (2009), PHR adoption as a synonym for 
opt-in behavior. The follow-up questionnaire included gender, age, and education to assess the 
demographic characteristics of the participants. Since individuals often indicate an attitude different from 
their actual behavior (Acquisti et al. 2015), we asked participants to state their attitude towards a PHR 
platform like the one of eHealth ventures (Attitude). We applied the three-item attitude scale of Angst and 
Agarwal (2009). Furthermore, we included scales for Privacy Concerns, adapted from Pavlou et al. (2007), 
and Perceived Benefits, adapted from Xu et al. (2011) into the follow-up questionnaire. The scale for privacy 
concerns contained three items, asking individuals if they are afraid of privacy violations when using PHR 
platforms like POLAVIS VIVA, e.g., “I am concerned about my privacy when using PHR platforms like 
POLAVIS VIVA.” The perceived benefits scale asked individuals how beneficial they expect PHR platforms 
like POLAVIS VIVA to be in regard to healthcare management, e.g., “Overall, I feel that using PHR 
platforms like POLAVIS VIVA is beneficial.” The three scales have each been assessed through three items 
on seven-point Likert scales. Throughout the whole questionnaire, we kept the scales as close as possible to 
the original. As the participants of our study were not retrieved from survey pools and are thus not 
necessarily familiar with answering questionnaires, we applied comparably short scales to reduce dropout 
rates. Before conducting the experiment, we refined the design of the treatment conditions and the follow-
up questionnaire through pretesting. 
Manipulation Checks 
To verify the effectiveness of our treatments, we included manipulation checks into the follow-up 
questionnaire. Participants had to select the treatment they received among all four treatments to check 
whether they had paid attention to their treatment. In addition, we included specific questions to check 
whether the scenarios had the desired effect on the participants’ beliefs. First, to verify the manipulation of 
financial incentives, we asked whether participants believe that POLAVIS VIVA provides financial 
incentives for participation. Second, to verify the manipulation of personalization incentives, we asked 
whether participants believe that POLAVIS VIVA provides personalized content and services based on the 
individuals’ health data. Third, to verify the manipulation of fair information practices, we asked whether 
participants believe that POLAVIS VIVA takes measures to protect their personal data. 
Data Collection and Cleaning 
In total, 250,000 participants received the e-mail invitation to register for POLAVIS VIVA. A marketing 
agency, which had collected the e-mail addresses via a double opt-in procedure, sent out both e-mails. We 
decided to use this method of participant recruitment instead of standard experiment pools to create real 
conditions. Participants of standard experiment pools could anticipate our experimental setting, which in 
turn could bias the results. Furthermore, the marketing agency guaranteed that the sample was 
representative of the German adult population. We divided the total sample randomly into four groups with 
62,500 participants each, corresponding to the four scenarios. Irrespective of whether the participants had 
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registered for POLAVIS VIVA, all those who opened the first e-mail received the invitation to participate in 
the follow-up questionnaire. 
Of the initial mailing list, 6.6% of participants opened the first e-mail and thus received the request to 
participate in our follow-up questionnaire. Of the participants that received the follow-up e-mail, 3,358 
participants opened the follow-up e-mail, and 276 participated in the follow-up questionnaire. We excluded 
two participants who registered for POLAVIS VIVA, as they did not participate in the follow-up 
questionnaire. This was necessary for two reasons. First, to create the dataset, we had to match the e-mail 
addresses collected during the registration process with the e-mail addresses from the follow-up 
questionnaire. Second, to conduct the experiment in an ethically correct manner, we asked participants in 
the follow-up questionnaire explicitly for their consent to the use of their data for the purpose of our study. 
Furthermore, we did not include participants who registered for POLAVIS VIVA after the follow-up 
questionnaire was sent out. Since the follow-up questionnaire made participants aware of the experimental 
setting, this step was necessary to maintain the explanatory power of a field experiment. Our final data set 
consists of 216 participants of which 48 registered for POLAVIS VIVA. Of the 216 participants that answered 
the follow-up survey, 53 received financial incentives, 57 personalization incentives, 55 fair information 
practices, and 51 received none of the three treatments. Of those that registered, 10 received financial 
incentives, 16 personalization incentives, 14 fair information practices, and 8 did not receive any of the three 
treatment conditions. 
Analysis 
The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality revealed that the error terms are not normally distributed. As probit 
regression assumes a normal distribution of the error terms, we applied a logit regression function. The 
individuals’ decisions to use PHR platforms are largely determined by their attitudes towards PHR 
platforms. Since we set out to analyze how incentives can change PHR adoption rates given this pre-existing 
attitude, we included attitude into the regression as a control variable. As the follow-up survey was 
conducted after participants were exposed to the treatments, we included the regression residual of attitude 
on financial incentives, personalization incentives, and fair information practices (rAttitude). This residual 
reflects the pre-existing attitude towards the PHR platform independent of the treatments. To further check 
the robustness of our model, we have tested the effects when including demographic variables such as age, 
gender, and education as additional control variables. The results remain virtually the same. Furthermore, 
to validate our line of argumentation regarding distributive and procedural justice, we conduct binary-
mediation analyses in which the effects of financial incentives, personalization incentives, and fair 
information practices on the adoption rate are mediated by perceived benefits and privacy concerns, 
respectively. As the mediator is continuous whereas the dependent variable is binary, mediation requires a 
combination of OLS with either probit or logit models (Kenny, 2008). Therefore, we compute indirect 
effects with standardized coefficients. To receive standard errors and confidence intervals, we bootstrapped 
binary-mediation with 5,000 replications. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The average age is 44.4 years. The gender distribution of our sample is 56% female and 42% male with 2% 
of participants not revealing their gender. Compared to the average of the German population, the 
education of our participants is relatively high, with 37.8% holding a high school degree or higher education. 
The education characteristics are comparable between the participants that registered (group 1) and those 
that did not register (group 2). In terms of gender, the distribution between the two groups differs slightly. 
Group 1 includes 2.55% more women than group 2. The age structure varies slightly between the groups. 
The age average among group 1 is 48.45 years, while the age average among group 2 is 43.22 years. The 
scales for attitude, privacy concerns and perceived benefits performed well with Cronbach’s alpha values 
over 0.80.  
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Results from Regression Analysis 
Table 1 depicts the results of the logit regression and average marginal effects for interpreting the effect 
sizes. Our final model reports a McFadden Pseudo R² value of 0.24, indicating good model fit with the data. 
In addition, the likelihood ratio Chi-square test (Chi-square = 55.40; p = 0.00) as well as the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test (Chi-square = 7.25; p = 0.51) confirm that our model fits the data well. In Hypothesis 1, we 
suggested that financial incentives increase PHR adoption rates. The logit regression does not show a 
significant effect of financial incentives on PHR adoption (coefficient = 0.61; p = 0.33). Therefore, we do 
not support Hypothesis 1. However, our results support Hypothesis 2, predicting that personalization 
incentives increase PHR adoption rates. The calculation of the marginal effects reveals that the offer of 
personalization incentives significantly increases PHR adoption rates, on average by 19.70 % at the one 
percent level. Moreover, the calculation of the marginal effects confirms Hypothesis 3 by revealing that fair 
information practices significantly increase PHR adoption rates on average by 17.39 % at the five percent 
level. We further calculated the percentage of cases correctly classified by our model. Overall, the 
classification results show a correct specification for 78.24% of the participants. 
Table 1. Logit Regression Results and Average Marginal Effects 
Registration Coefficients of logit regression Average marginal effects dy/dx in % 
Financial .61 (.63) 7.80 (.08) 
Personalization 1.51* (.61) 19.70** (.08) 
FIP 1.34* (.61) 17.39* (.08) 
rAttitude 1.15*** (.20) 15.00*** (.02) 
Constant -2.80*** (.56)  
McFadden Pseudo R² .24  
Subjects 216 216 
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Results controlling for age, sex, and education are virtually the same and are 
therefore not included in the table. The abbreviation FIP stands for fair information practices. Significant effects are written in 
bold. * p < .05, two-tailed test, ** p < .01, two-tailed test, *** p < .001, two-tailed test 
Mediation Analyses 
As in the regression analysis, we could not find any significant mediation effects for financial incentives. 
However, our results reveal at the five percent level significantly positive indirect and total effects for 
personalization incentives indicating full mediation of personalization on PHR adoption through perceived 
benefits. Furthermore, for the effect of fair information practices on PHR adoption through privacy 
concerns, the results reveal significant positive indirect and total effects, again indicating a full mediation 
at five percent level. Thus, our results support H4b and H4c. Table 2 shows the standardized coefficients of 
indirect, direct and total effects as well as confidence intervals of the described mediation analyses. 
Table 2. Binary-Mediation Analyses 
 Financial Incentives Personalization Incentives Fair Information Practices 
Obs. 
Coeff. 
95% CI Obs. 
Coeff. 
95% CI Obs. Coeff. 95% CI 
Indirect 
Effect 
-.01(.02) [-.06|.04] .11 (.06) [.01|.23] .07 (.03) [.01|.14] 
Direct 
Effect 
.16(.14) [-.13|.45] .24 (.14) [-01|.52] .19 (.14) [-.08|.48] 
Total 
Effect 
.15(.15) [-.14|.45] .35 (.13) [.11|.59] .26 (.14) [.00|.53] 
Note. Standardized bootstrap results with 5000 replications are reported. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The abbreviation CI stands for confidence interval. Significant effects are written in bold. 
 The (In)Effectiveness of Incentives 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 11 
 
To deepen our understanding on the influences of personalization incentives and fair information practices 
on PHR adoption we examine whether perceived benefits and privacy concerns are significantly different 
among the treatment conditions. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) results show that on average perceived 
benefits are lowest for financial incentives, followed by fair information practices, and personalization 
incentives with the highest value of perceived benefits. The average value of privacy concerns is lowest for 
fair information practices, followed by personalization incentives, and financial incentives with the highest 
value of privacy concerns. All differences are statistically significant at one percent level. 
Discussion 
The findings of our study show that personalization incentives - as implemented in our study - increase 
PHR adoption. According to distributive justice, individuals conduct an input-output assessment before 
disclosing their personal information online. If the perceived output compensates for the data input, 
individuals will perceive the exchange as fair and thus disclose their information online. Personalized 
content in exchange for personal information constitutes an additional benefit that increases the perception 
of distributive justice (Culnan and Bies 2003). Following justice theory, the offer of personalization 
incentives should thus increase distributive justice perceptions and increase the likelihood of PHR 
adoption. Therefore, our result is in line with the arguments of justice theory. However, in the derivation of 
Hypothesis 2 we demonstrated that the findings of previous literature are inconsistent. The 
personalization-privacy paradox provides an explanation for the contradictory results. Personalization 
increases both perceived benefits and risks since the value of personalization arises only through the 
inclusion of personal information. Thus concerns regarding the disclosure of personal data in exchange for 
personalization could outweigh the benefits (Awad and Krishnan 2006; Xu et al. 2011). As stated above, 
personalization offers particular value in the healthcare context. The benefits that personalization 
incentives provide for individuals are especially evident when it comes to improvements in diagnosis and 
treatments as well as increased patient safety (Fichman et al. 2011; Reti et al. 2009; Vance et al. 2015). The 
personalization incentives implemented in our experiment contribute to the inherent benefits of PHRs and 
thereby, support the ultimate objective of PHRs. Therefore, we argue that the high value that 
personalization offers in health care compared to other areas is a possible explanation for the relatively 
strong positive effect of personalization incentives in our experiment. 
Our results also reveal that fair information practices - as implemented in our study - significantly increase 
the likelihood that individuals will adopt PHR platforms. According to justice theory, fair information 
practices serve as a signal that the organization treats personal information in a respectful and transparent 
manner. Subsequently, privacy concerns decrease and the willingness to disclose personal information 
increases (Culnan and Bies 2003). Therefore, our finding of a positive effect of fair information practices 
on the adoption rate of PHRs is in line with the theoretical notions of justice theory. Nevertheless, as shown 
in the derivation of Hypothesis 3 studies conducted in different cultural and contextual backgrounds show 
contradictory results. We see two reasons for the comparably strong effect of fair information practices in 
our study. First, Germany is particularly conservative with regard to data protection (Hofstede 1980). As 
we conducted the experiment in Germany, participants in our study could have been culturally influenced. 
Second, in the PHR context data privacy is of particular importance due to the high sensitivity of personal 
health information. Thus, participants of our study could have assigned a higher value to data privacy than 
in other commercial settings (e.g. Hui et al. 2007). 
Beyond that, we did not find a significant effect of financial incentives on PHR adoption. As the concept of 
distributive justice predicts that financial incentives constitute an additional benefit that increases 
perceptions of justice and subsequently makes the incentivized behavior more likely (Culnan and Bies 
2003), our finding does not support the notions of justice theory. We see three interrelated explanations 
for the insignificant effect. First, prior research identified two counter-effects of financial incentives 
(Gneezy et al. 2011). On the one hand, financial incentives have a direct effect that has a positive impact on 
the incentivized behavior. On the other hand, financial incentives can also trigger an indirect effect that 
works in the opposite direction and thus makes the incentivized behavior less likely, as they can provoke 
the awareness that the counterpart collects and uses personal information. Hence, financial incentives can 
imply high risks of data disclosure. Moreover, the offer of financial incentives can evoke the negative feeling 
of selling personal data and subsequently increase privacy concerns (Gneezy et al. 2011). Following this line 
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of argumentation, the incentivized behavior becomes less likely despite the monetary value of financial 
incentives. According to Hoffman et al. (1999), the positive effect of financial incentives is invalidated in 
contexts of high risks and uncertainties. Previous literature provides clear evidence that health data is 
comparatively sensitive and thus associated with risk and uncertainty (Bansal et al. 2010; Kam and Chismar 
2006; Rohm and Milne 2004). Bansal et al. (2010) show that an increase in perceived data sensitivity 
significantly increases privacy concerns, which in turn lowers the intention to disclose sensitive health 
information. Second, we argue that the effect of incentives depends on the context relatedness, i.e. whether 
financial incentives contribute to the ultimate purpose of the incentivized behavior or not (Promberger et 
al. 2012). In our study, financial incentives only provide a monetary value that is independent of the 
inherent benefit of PHRs. By contrast, in contexts that naturally involve a monetary exchange, financial 
incentives provide a direct contribution. Therefore, incentives like personalized content or services that 
improve the healthcare situation of individuals directly might be more efficient in supporting PHR 
adoption. The study of Promberger et al. (2012) supports this line of argumentation. Investigating the 
effects of different financial incentives to change health related behavior they find that vouchers for healthy 
grocery were more efficient than vouchers for luxury items. Thirdly, building on this, we argue that the 
impact of financial incentives depends on the way of implementation (Promberger et al. 2012; Volpp et al. 
2008). We implemented financial incentives as a monetary compensation that is not related to health care. 
However, there are ways to relate financial incentives to the purpose of PHRs. For example, insurance 
companies or employers offering PHRs could provide users with a reduction of the insurance premium or 
other healthcare related savings. By linking the financial incentive to the purpose of PHRs, we expect 
stronger effects on the incentivized behavior (Promberger et al. 2012). 
Theoretical Implications 
Our study contributes to health information technology and privacy research in three ways. First, we close 
an important gap in health information technology adoption literature by examining the role of incentives 
(Anderson and Agarwal 2011). Previous research in the health information technology field largely focused 
on behavior-related beliefs of the individuals and risk-related factors to explain adoption decisions (Li et 
al. 2016). In this regard, the effects of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use (Guo et al. 2013; Hung 
et al. 2014; Lishan et al. 2009; Maass and Varshney 2012; Miltgen et al. 2013; Moores 2012; Wu et al. 2011), 
privacy concerns (Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Angst and Agarwal 2009; Li 2014b; Miltgen et al. 2013), 
technology anxiety (Guo et al. 2013; Lim et al. 2011), and trust (Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Miltgen et al. 
2013) have been often examined. Although empirical evidence on the effects of these factors is important 
to understand PHR adoption, evidence on the impact of incentives can help organizations to drive health 
information technology adoption. As this evidence was still missing (Anderson and Agarwal 2011), we have 
extended previous research by analyzing the impact of financial incentives and personalization incentives 
on PHR adoption decisions. The investigation of incentives is of further importance since the 
personalization-privacy paradox (Awad and Krishnan 2006), the context dependency, and the 
aforementioned counter-effects of financial incentives (Gneezy et al. 2011; Hoffman et al. 1999) raise 
ambiguities regarding the mechanisms of incentives. Second, we applied justice theory to the PHR context. 
Thereby, we extend the theoretical understanding that has so far been limited to mainly technology 
acceptance models (Johnson et al. 2014; Lim et al. 2011; Lishan et al. 2009; Maass and Varshney 2012; 
Moores 2012) and the privacy calculus (Li 2014b; Li et al. 2016). Even though justice theory provides 
promising impulses for measures firms can take to foster health technology adoption, no previous study 
has applied a justice theory framework. Overall, our findings support the notions of justice theory that 
measures of distributive and procedural justice significantly affect privacy concerns and perceived benefits 
and thus increase PHR adoption (Culnan and Bies 2003). However, we find that financial incentives in 
terms of monetary compensation and personalization incentives play a different role in the healthcare 
context. The two incentives affect the adoption of PHR differently, as they correspond to different benefit 
perceptions. We argue that, personalization incentives contribute to the inherent benefits of PHR usage and 
thus increase perceived benefits significantly. By contrast, the benefit of monetary compensation is not 
related to the ultimate purpose of PHRs. Thus, our study emphasizes that the concept of distributive justice 
is more complex and context dependent than prior research suggests. Third, we assessed actual behavior 
instead of behavioral intention by conducting a randomized controlled field experiment. As previous 
literature mainly focused on the behavioral intention (Anderson and Agarwal 2011; Angst and Agarwal 
2009; Bansal et al. 2010; Li et al. 2014), evidence on actual adoption is still scarce. Prior research 
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demonstrates a significant gap between attitude or intention and actual behavior (Acquisti et al. 2015; 
Sheeran 2002). Therefore, the observation of actual behavior provides a key contribution to the discussion 
of health information technology adoption. 
These discussion points raise the question whether the way in which incentives have so far been classified 
is applicable for all contexts. We propose that it is not the distinction between monetary and non-monetary 
incentives (e.g. Milne and Gordon 1993) that matters but rather the context relatedness that makes a 
difference for the effects of organizational measures (Promberger et al. 2012). Whereas financial incentives 
in terms of monetary compensation can work e.g. for e-commerce settings (Premazzi et al. 2010), we argue 
that they do not work in contexts, in which the incentivized behavior is not naturally related to a monetary 
exchange. In the context of our study, financial incentives represent a value that is not related to the ultimate 
purpose of PHRs. Personalization incentives and fair information practices, by contrast, directly or 
indirectly increase the inherent value of the PHR. Therefore, our study constitutes a starting point to re-
think the conceptualization of incentives for different contexts. 
Practical Implications 
Our findings yield several practical implications for a variety of PHR providers such as governments, 
insurers, and employers. The insignificant effect of financial incentives implies that the offer of monetary 
compensation does not constitute an appropriate strategy to foster PHR disclosure behavior. Our 
discussion revealed that in contexts of high risks and uncertainty, financial incentives could even provoke 
reactions against the incentivized behavior (Gneezy et al. 2011; Hoffman et al. 1999). Therefore, we suggest 
that organizations that are generally associated with high risks in terms of data privacy, such as insurers 
(Anderson and Agarwal 2011), should avoid financial incentives and focus on other ways to support PHR 
adoption. Furthermore, we argue that in contrast to settings that naturally involve a monetary exchange, 
monetary compensation per se plays a subordinate role for data disclosure decisions in healthcare. 
Individuals decide to use PHRs as they expect a positive impact on their health care. Therefore, we suggest 
that financial incentives only yield a positive effect on PHR disclosure decisions if they relate to the health 
care of individuals (e.g. reductions in insurance premiums or price reductions on health services). 
In contrast to monetary compensation, personalization incentives constitute a promising way to support 
PHR adoption rates. Our findings show that personalization incentives significantly increase PHR 
adoption. In health care, personalization offers unparalleled value. Personalization of health care through 
digital solutions enhances the efficiency of diagnosis processes, improves communication with health care 
professionals, and reduces medication errors (Fichman et al. 2011; Reti et al. 2009). A significant advantage 
of personalization incentives over financial incentives becomes relevant in the long term. Personalization 
incentives are, in contrast to most financial incentives, of a dynamic nature. The value created by 
personalized content and services will continue to develop as long as new data input is provided (Gneezy et 
al. 2011). Therefore, personalization incentives could be particularly effective in influencing the use of PHR 
platforms in the long term. 
Furthermore, fair information practices can significantly increase PHR adoption rates as they provide 
particular value in the context of sensitive health information. However, PHR providers need to pay 
attention to the specific way of implementation to benefit from the positive effects. There are several ways 
to implement fair information practices (Hui et al. 2007). Nevertheless, Awad and Krishnan (2006) argue 
that only measures that go beyond legal standards will make a difference for the behavioral decisions of 
individuals. Furthermore, organizations implementing fair information practices to support PHR adoption 
should be aware of contextual differences (Hui et al. 2007). As discussed above, cultural backgrounds can 
make a difference for the impact of fair information practices. However, especially for PHR providers in 
Germany and other countries with cultures of high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 1980), the 
implementation of signals of fair information practices is beneficial. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Our study has some limitations that provide opportunities for future research. The German culture has one 
of the highest uncertainty avoidance values (Hofstede 1980). Therefore, our results are relatively 
conservative and should hold for cultures characterized by lower uncertainty avoidance as well. However, 
as prior research has found that cultural backgrounds can have an impact on privacy concerns (Milberg et 
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al. 1995; Milberg et al. 2000), future research should address this topic by examining the impact of cultural 
backgrounds on PHR adoption decisions. Furthermore, our real-world experimental design implied that 
only those individuals could be considered who opened the first e-mail and who answered the follow-up 
study. There are two major arguments, however, that provide an explanation why this sampling bias is not 
fatal to our study. First, we only excluded a small number of two individuals that registered for POLAVIS 
VIVA but did not answer the follow-up survey. Second, we conducted the experiment in a real-world setting. 
Thus, even though we only included those individuals who opened the e-mails, our sample provides 
valuable implications as it represents the relevant target group. Nevertheless, it is essential to account for 
this sampling bias when interpreting the results. 
PHRs differ in terms of platform features and provider identity. They can be integrated into the patients’ 
existing electronic medical records or they can be standalone systems provided by insurers, employers, 
governments, or private organizations. Research on PHR adoption has not yet analyzed the effects of PHR 
type and provider identity. Thus, we see promising opportunities for future research that sheds light on the 
influence of distributive and procedural justice when the PHR related context factors change (Anderson 
and Agarwal 2011; Kehr et al. 2015). Furthermore, future research should focus on the provision of data 
and use of PHRs in the long term. We did not find any significant differences in the number of data released 
by individuals between the different scenarios of our experiment. This result could mean that the actual 
decisive step is the decision to register for the PHR platform. Once individuals have decided to opt-in, the 
amount of data they disclose could play a subordinate role. Therefore, we call for future research that sheds 
light on this mechanism. Due to limited data access, we were only able to examine data provision within the 
first two weeks of usage. Since the value of PHR systems mostly arises through long-term use (Assadi and 
Hassanein 2017; Devaraj and Kohli 2000), future research should conduct longitudinal studies to further 
examine time effects, as well as other measures, that induce individuals to use PHRs in the long term 
(Archer et al. 2011; Lester et al. 2016). 
Moreover, we found that the different components of justice theory are strongly context dependent. 
Whereas monetary compensation might incentivize individuals to disclose data in a setting that naturally 
involves a monetary exchange, they do not work in the PHR context. However, personalization incentives 
and fair information practices that directly or indirectly relate to the ultimate objective of PHRs do 
significantly increase PHR adoption. Thus, we propose that future research should re-think the common 
classifications of e.g. monetary versus non-monetary incentives (Milne and Gordon 1993) and examine the 
underlying cause-effects relationships of context related versus context un-related incentives. In this 
regard, a further limitation for the generalizability of our study refers to the implementation of financial 
incentives, as there are numerous possible ways of implementation (Volpp et al. 2008). We therefore 
encourage future studies to consider the effects of PHR-related financial incentives such as reductions in 
insurance premiums or price reductions on healthcare services on PHR adoption. 
Conclusion 
Despite significant increases in efficiency and cost savings associated with their implementation, the 
prevalence of PHRs has so far been low. The goal of this study was to shed light on organizational measures 
that induce individuals to adopt PHR platforms. Drawing on justice theory, we developed a conceptual 
framework and derived theoretically grounded hypotheses about the impact of financial incentives, 
personalization incentives, and fair information practices on the adoption of PHR platforms. In cooperation 
with eHealth ventures, a PHR platform provider in Germany, we conducted a randomized controlled field 
experiment with 216 participants. The results of our experiment show that the likelihood that individuals 
register for a PHR platform does not increase with financial incentives. Personalization incentives and fair 
information practices, by contrast, significantly increase PHR adoption rates by increasing perceived 
benefits and reducing privacy concerns, respectively. Overall, our results support the notions of justice 
theory as we showed that measures of both distributive and procedural justice foster PHR adoption. 
However, we emphasize that the subordinate mechanisms of the effects of distributive and procedural 
justice on behavioral decisions are more complex and context dependent than prior literature assumed. 
Therefore, we encourage future researchers to join the discussion and to conduct more nuanced analyses 
on the effects of context dependency of different incentives. 
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